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7. CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN THE  
EX-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: THE ROLE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC  
AND CIVIC RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT 
Zoran PAVLOVIĆ** 
Bojan TODOSIJEVIĆ*** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Autonomy is treated as a major element in a number of value models and often 
as a very important feature of the democratic political culture. The aim of this 
paper is to analyse the valuing of autonomy in a number of ex-communist and 
non-communist European countries, as well as the changes in that regard in the 
period between 1999 and 2009 and their main determinants. The data from the 
European Values Study and the World Values Study were used and aggregate, 
country-level analysis was performed. A total of 38 European countries were 
included, which comprised 47.999 respondents for 1999 and 58.155 respondents 
for 2009. Autonomy valuing was operationalized via the preference for the 
qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home, opposing support 
for independence/determination and religious faith/obedience. The Freedom 
House scores and Human Development Index values were used as measures of 
civic and political rights and socio-economic development of the countries, 
respectively. The results indicate that half of the ex-communist and the majority 
of the non-communist European countries show a significant increase in the 
autonomy preference over the ten-year period. In the non-communist 
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countries, the autonomy shift is significantly enhanced by the rising level of 
socio-economic development. Enhanced guarantees of civil and political rights 
and freedoms are, however, the major factors in promoting autonomy in the ex-
communist societies. The obtained findings are discussed in terms of the 
institutional model of political culture, as well as in the context of the main 
assumptions of the self-determination theory.  
KEYWORDS: autonomy, values, ex-communist societies, European Values 
Survey 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autonomy figures as a very important concept in cross-cultural and 
political culture studies. It is usually treated as one of the main 
dimensions of cross-cultural variations. Similarly, numerous value 
syndromes that are described as an essence of the democratic political 
culture include the concepts that are either rooted in or very similar to 
autonomy. Bearing in mind that the (political) culture of East European 
societies is usually described in, broadly speaking, collectivistic terms, as 
incompatible with functional democracy, the matter of changes in the 
preferences of autonomy becomes a rather important one. This paper is 
aimed at analysing the changes in autonomy preference over a ten-year 
period in a number of European countries, with special focus on the ex-
communist countries, which had experienced dramatic societal changes 
in the past several decades. The question of the relationship between the 
socio-political transformation and the predominant values thus becomes 
very prominent, both theoretically and empirically. In addressing these 
issues we proceed as follows. Firstly, a brief overview of the conceptual 
status of autonomy in the dominant value models is provided. The role of 
autonomy in promoting democracy is then debated, as well as the 
different models of political culture and value change. In the following 
section, the present study is described. The chapter concludes with the 
discussion of the obtained results. 
THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DIFFERENT VALUE MODELS 
There are several different approaches proposed in the literature for 
analysing the cross-cultural differences in values. These vary in the 
methodological design, the unit of analysis, as well as in the main 
dimensions of culture and their theoretical underpinnings. However, 
many, if not all, share a view that individualism is one of the main 
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dimensions of cross-cultural variation. It is without doubt also one of the 
most empirically researched dimensions (Triandis, 2004). 
The individualism versus collectivism dimension plays a prominent 
role in the work of Hofstede (2001) and Triandis (2004). In both cases, 
individualism is conceptualized similarly, as a matter of focus on the 
rights above duties, personal accomplishments, autonomy and self-
fulfilment (Hofstede, 2001); it is a matter of the definition of the self as 
independent or interdependent with some in-group (Triandis, 2004). 
Similarly, one of the main value dimensions in Schwartz’s (2004; 2007) 
value model is the autonomy versus embeddedness, which taps the 
nature of the relation or the boundaries between the person and the 
group. In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, free to 
cultivate and express their own preferences, ideals, feelings etc. as 
opposed to people as “entities”, embedded in collectivity. Inglehart posits 
two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation, one of them being 
survival/self-expression values (Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005) which emphasize giving priority to the quality of life, well-being, 
freedom of choice and participation in decision-making in social and 
political matters. Although significantly different in terms of their 
operationalization and theoretical underpinnings, individualism, self-
expression values and autonomy conceptually overlap, most notably in 
contrasting the autonomous and the interdependent view of people (e.g. 
Inglehart, 2004; Pavlović, 2009; Schwartz, 2004). Similarly, two main 
dimensions of value diversity were identified in exploring and mapping 
the values of European citizens: normative-religious and autonomy-
social-liberalism (Hagenaars, Halman & Moors, 2003). Most recently, 
under the so-called human empowerment model, Welzel (2013) has 
described the emancipative values as a major psychological and 
motivational force that guides people towards the acceptance of the 
universal human rights and freedoms, and democracy as their 
institutional outcome. These values include the emphasis on the freedom 
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of choice, equality, voice of the people and, most importantly, on 
autonomy (Welzel, 2013).  
AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
Apart from being a major conceptual tool in analysing the cross-cultural 
variations and explaining cultural differences around the world, the 
individualism-collectivism dimension has well-documented political 
“payoffs”. The notion of individualism is close to and rooted in liberal 
ideology, whose main features include individual self-determination, 
personal rights and freedoms and limited state control. All of these form 
the cornerstone of modern democracy, while individualism itself 
represents an antidote to group conformity and submission to authority 
(Kemmelmeier, Burnstein, Krumov, Genkova, Kanagawa, Hirshberg, 
Wieczorkowska & Noels, 2003). Empirically, individualism is, on the 
individual level, positively related to pro-civic and democratic features, 
such as social capital (Allik & Realo, 2004) and negatively with its 
opposites, for example, right-wing authoritarianism (Kemmelmeier et al., 
2003). On the aggregate, country level, abundant research has shown that 
various value dimensions that are intertwined with individualism are 
correlated with some of the most important and basic measures of 
countries’ democratic performance (e.g. Freedom House scores). The 
more democratic a country, the higher its position is on the autonomy-
embeddedness measure (Schwartz, 2004). Also, its citizens are more 
inclined to accept, for instance, self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; 
Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) or emancipative values (Welzel, 2013). In 
short, individualism is viewed as supportive of long-term democratic 
regimes and equality in social relations (Tirandis, Bontempo, Villareal, 
Asai & Lucca, 1988; Hofstede, 1980). On the other side, the main “flaw” 
of collectivism is mainly described in the political domain, it‘s 
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compatibility with the countries under authoritarian and non-democratic 
regimes (Triandis et al., 1988).1 
Furthermore, some related empirical findings are of special relevance 
for this paper. Since more democratic countries are usually higher on 
various measures of individualism/autonomy and those countries are, as 
a rule, Western societies, the East/West division in these terms is often 
registered and discussed. The East European countries are, in comparison 
to Western European ones, lower on self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009), autonomy (Hagenaars, Halman & 
Moors, 2003; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) and emancipative 
values (Welzel, 2013). If such value syndromes are conducive to 
democracy, then the often heard argument that the political culture of 
“new” democracies in Eastern Europe lacks some of the main features of 
the democratic political culture is justified (e.g. Klingemann, Fuchs, & 
Zielonka, 2006). Since, supposedly, values change only in the long term, it 
will take (a long) time for the newly established democracies to develop a 
genuinely democratic political culture and become fully functional.  
This brings us to the important question of the value/political culture 
change. Two relatively opposing views are discussed in the literature. The 
political culture or culturalist paradigm proposes that, since values are 
relatively stable characteristics, acquired in the early adolescence, they 
can be changed only in the long term and under the influence of general, 
structural changes in a society, such as the socio-economic 
modernization, and via generational replacement (Almond & Verba, 
1983; Eckstein, 1988; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Since the majority of the 
ex-communist countries’ citizens were socialized under the non-
democratic, authoritarian regimes, the democratization of political 
                                                            
1 Some authors argue that individualism and collectivism are not the opposites of one dimension, 
but rather two distinct and separate measures. However, this line of discussion goes beyond the 
scope of the present paper (see, for example, Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
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culture is not likely in the near future. The flow from values/culture to 
institutions/structure is unidirectional, and hence, to create an effective 
democracy, we must “create” democrats first.  
Still, a variety of other models, such as the lifetime learning or 
rational choice (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Misher & Pollock, 2003; Whitfield 
& Evans, 1999), give much more weight to individual rationality and 
recent experiences. Prevailing values are not the consequence of early 
instilled beliefs but constantly “updated” strategies, dependent on the 
political and economic performances of the newly established democratic 
regimes. This implies that the acceptance of democratic values comes as a 
consequence of experiencing democracy and its evaluations. Introducing 
democracy in a society would supposedly breed “democrats” and the 
process could be accomplished in a relatively short term.  
THE PRESENT STUDY 
This paper addresses the afore-mentioned issues in relation to the 
evaluation of autonomy in the ex-communist societies. Furthermore, we 
examine the changes that happened in the ten-year period, from 1999 to 
2009, and investigate the main determinants of these changes. If values 
are predominantly influenced by structural changes (Inglehart, 1990; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013) then the eventual changes in the 
autonomy preference should be primarily related to the changes in the 
level of socio-economic development of a country. Such a view is 
relatively well supported by empirical data (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; 
Schwartz, 2004; Welzel, 2013). On the other hand, previous research has 
shown that, for instance, the trade-offs between predominant values and 
political structure could be quite the reverse. The increase in 
emancipative values (Spaiser, Ranganathan, Mann & Sumpter, 2014) or 
autonomy (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000) is, at least partly, the consequence of 
human rights based democratization. Growing acceptance of numerous 
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pro-democratic orientations such as political tolerance (Duch & Gibson, 
1992), trust in social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997), 
support for marketization and democracy (Pavlović, 2014; 2016; 
Whitefield & Evans, 1999) or post-materialist values (Pavlović, 2015) can 
be quite well explained in the rational choice terms, i.e. the effects of 
economic and political performance evaluations. This being true would 
imply that increasing institutional guarantees of rights and freedoms 
should be conducive for the preference of those values compatible with 
these institutional outcomes, such as autonomy. Testing these 
assumptions is of particular relevance in the ex-communist societies. 
These countries underwent turbulent socio-economic-political changes 
in the last twenty years, which can be related to changes in valuing 
autonomy. On the other hand, it would shed some light on the on-going 
debate regarding the possibility of the democratization of political culture 
and East European countries’ prospect in these terms.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Data used in the analysis come from the third (1999) and fourth (2009) 
wave of the European Values Study (EVS, 2015) and the fourth wave 
(1996-1999) of the World Values Survey (World Values Survey 
Association, 2015). The data for the following 38 European countries are 
used in the analysis: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, FYR Macedonia and The United 
Kingdom. The sample for the first observed period comprised of 47.999 
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respondents;2 58.155 respondents in total were included in the second 
time period. The primary interest is in the sources and the pattern of the 
change in the autonomy preference in the ex-communist Europe. Still, 
since the West/East division is well documented (Hagenaars, Halman & 
Moors, 2003; Pavlović, 2006; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Todosijevic, 2008; 
2011) and the models of value change tend to be formulated in a rather 
universalistic and uniform way (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 
2013), the rest of the European countries are included in the analysis as 
well. In that way, it will be possible to tell whether there is anything 
specific or different in the value change in Eastern Europe. 
Data and measures  
Valuing of autonomy. Preference for autonomy was measured by the 
autonomy index developed in the World Values Survey dataset and (with 
modifications) repeatedly used elsewhere (e.g. Welzel, 2013; Pavlović, 
2010). This measure represents giving priority to autonomy over 
authority and is based on the preference for the qualities that children 
should be encouraged to learn at home. Out of ten offered qualities, 
respondents were asked to choose five that they thought children should 
be encouraged to learn at home (yes/no response format). The autonomy 
index contrasts the preference for independence and 
determination/perseverance as important child qualities, on the one 
hand, and religious faith and obedience on the other. The scores for 
independence/determination variables were summed up and then the 
sum of scores on religious faith/obedience variables was subtracted from 
it. The resulting measure ranges from -2 to +2, higher scores implying the 
more intense valuing of autonomy.  
                                                            
2 Since the third wave of the EVS included a smaller number of countries than the fourth, the data 
for the first observed period in 1999 for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Norway, 
Serbia, Switzerland and FYR Macedonia come from the fourth wave of the WVS.  
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HDI measure. As a measure of the level of the countries’ socio-
economic development the well-known Human Development Index 
(HDI), developed by the UNDP is used. HDI represents a composite 
measure combining life expectancy, education, and per capita income 
indicators; the higher the lifespan, education level and GDP per capita, 
the higher the HDI country values. The HDI values for each of the 
analysed countries in the two observed periods were obtained from the 
existing UNDP data.3 Higher values imply the higher level of 
socioeconomic development. 
Freedom House measures. The Freedom House measures of the 
current state of civil and political rights on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 
(least free) were used as an indicator of the countries’ level of political 
development and democracy. The measures for each analysed country 
are from the official Freedom House reports;4 civil and political rights 
scores were averaged and computed for the two observed periods. Higher 
values imply a lower level of civil and political rights and freedoms. 
Communist past. One dichotomous measure, differentiating between 
the countries that had and did not have a communist past, was created 
and used in the analysis. 
RESULTS 
We proceed in analysing the data as follows. Firstly, the changes in 
valuing of the autonomy over the ten-year period in two groups of 
countries, the ex-communist (mostly East European) and the non-
communist (mostly West European) countries are analysed. We then 
perform a closer inspection of the observed changes in autonomy 
preferences at the level of individual countries. Changes in the autonomy 
                                                            
3 http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
4 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/table-scores 
Changes in the valuing of autonomy in the ex-communist societies 
 
 
147 
preference are subsequently correlated with the changes in the countries’ 
level of socio-economic development and the changes in civil and 
political rights in the sample as a whole, as well as separately in two 
subsamples of countries. 
The mean values on autonomy measure for the two groups of 
countries in 1999 and 2009 are presented in Figure 1. Several important 
pieces of information are visible. First of all, there are no significant 
differences in the preference for autonomy between two groups of 
countries either in 1999, t (36) = -.70, p = .48, or in 2009, t (36) = 1.04,  
p = .30. In other words, autonomy is valued equally.  
 
FIGURE 1. VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN TWO GROUPS OF COUNTRIES IN 1999 AND 
2009 
 
Still, the opposite trends in the valuing of autonomy in two groups of 
countries are visible over the ten-year period. There is a significant 
increase in autonomy preference in the non-communist group of 
countries, t (17) = -2.10, p < .05, from 1999 (M = .31, SD = .46, SE = .10) 
to 2009 (M = .42, SD = .32, SE = .07). In the group of ex-communist 
countries, valuing of autonomy is lower in 2009 (M = .31, SD = .30,  
SE = .06) than in 1999 (M = .39, SD = .30, SE = .06), but the change is not 
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significant, t (19) = 1.48, p = .15. It looks like the differences in autonomy 
preference either along the West-East axis or at the two time points are 
either absent or very small. In other words, taking the two groups of 
countries as a whole, the valuing of autonomy is relatively stable and at 
the similar level. 
However, if we take a look at the patterns of the changes in the 
autonomy preference at the level of individual countries, there are large 
between-country differences in both groups of countries. The data are 
shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
An increase in the valuing of autonomy between 1999 and 2009 
(Figure 2) can be observed in about half of the ex-communist countries. 
The most pronounced changes are visible in Poland, Romania, and 
Moldova. Still, these three countries are the ones where autonomy is least 
valued. A decrease in autonomy preference has been registered in ten 
countries, most prominently in the case of Georgia, Greece, and Croatia. 
Autonomy is, in both time periods, most highly valued in Slovenia. 
 
FIGURE 2. CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN THE EX-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009 
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On the other hand, the non-communist European countries show a 
quite different pattern of change (Figure 3). Majority of countries (14 out 
of 18) show an increase in the autonomy preference, most notably in the 
case of Turkey, Portugal, and Malta. Still, similar to their East European 
counterparts, despite the greatest changes, Turkey and Malta are the non-
communist countries where autonomy is least valued. There is a decrease 
in the valuing of autonomy in a minority of countries, most pronounced 
in the case of Austria. Scandinavian countries are at the forefront of 
autonomous preference, which has been found almost regularly in 
previous studies with regard to other autonomy based or similar value 
syndromes (Arts & Halman, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Pavlović, 
2006). 
 
FIGURE 3. CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF AUTONOMY IN THE NON-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009 
 
If we turn to the analysis of the possible correlates of the changes in 
autonomy preference, there are some additional differences between the 
East and West. In the sample of all analysed countries, there is no 
significant correlation between the changes in Freedom House or HDI 
scores and changes in the preference for autonomy (Table 1).  
Changes in the valuing of autonomy in the ex-communist societies 
 
 
150 
Still, this pattern of associations between the main variables is quite 
different in two subsamples of countries. In the case of the non-
communist societies, a shift in the direction of higher valuing of 
autonomy is related to the rising level of socio-economic development 
(HDI index). The changes in autonomy valuing are not systematically 
related to the changes in civil and political rights and freedoms. 
TABLE 1. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN CHANGES IN THE VALUING OF 
AUTONOMY AND CHANGES IN FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES AND HDI VALUES 
BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009 
 
 All Non-communist 
countries 
Ex-communist 
countries 
Freedom House scores 
change 1999-2009 
-.29 .39 -.49* 
HDI scores change  
1999-2009 
-.18 .50* -.28 
*p < .05 
In the subsample of the ex-communist countries, the pro-autonomy 
shift is, quite contrary, significantly related only to the changes in the 
Freedom House scores. An increased level of the preference for autonomy 
is manifest in those countries that had experienced a more intense 
improvement in the protection of civil and political rights and freedoms 
over the ten-year period.5 On the other hand, the HDI scores change in 
the observed period is not significantly related to the changes in the 
autonomy valuing.  
                                                            
5 The relationship between the changes in the Freedom House scores and the changes in 
autonomy valuing remain significant even after controlling for the changes in the HDI scores in 
the ex-communist countries (r = -.61, p <. 01) 
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DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of this paper was to analyse the changes in valuing 
autonomy, an important aspect of an individualistic value outlook and 
one of the cornerstones of the democratic political culture, in East 
European, ex-communist societies. A related aim was to examine the 
importance of two macro variables that supposedly should play a very 
important role in value change – the level of socioeconomic development 
and the changes in the institutional guarantees of human rights and 
freedoms. It has been shown that political modernization is conducive to 
autonomy preference in the ex-communist context while the change in 
the level of the countries’ socio-economic development is not related to 
it. This finding has some very important implications and several 
interpretations could be offered.  
Before we proceed with the interpretation, let us first make a 
comment on the HDI and Freedom House data used in the analysis. In the 
non-communist group of countries, the changes in valuing autonomy are 
systematically related to the level of socio-economic development only. 
Yet, the fact is that in the observed period far more important societal 
changes have occurred in these terms than in the terms of civil rights and 
freedoms. For the majority of countries in this group, the changes in the 
Freedom House scores between 1999 and 2009 are absent. This is a sort of 
the “ceiling” effect; these countries are already “free” and there has been 
no improvement that the Freedom House scores could register. The 
reasoning for the HDI scores is likewise – a more intense improvement is 
more likely in the case of “poor” countries. In other words, the changes in 
the level of socio-economic development and institutional guarantees of 
human rights are visible only among the ex-communist societies. This 
makes the study of changes in autonomy preferences in East European 
countries even more relevant.  
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It seems that the findings support the assumptions of the institutional 
or rational choice model of value and political culture change. There is no 
dispute that values are relatively stable personal dispositions (Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1997; Pavlović, 2009). Still, being relatively stable does 
not mean being unchangeable at an individual or collective level. Values 
are in some sense adaptations to current life circumstances (Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). They are sensitive to the prevailing socio-
political context, dynamic, rationally based and reciprocally related to 
institutions, upgraded or downplayed depending on their utility (Mishler 
& Pollock, 2003; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Since societies develop and 
change rather slowly, so do the values. However, dramatic social changes 
could possibly cause a more prominent value shift. The regime change 
that the ex-communist countries experienced could count as such a 
dramatic social change. 
The results indeed demonstrate that in the ex-communist societies 
the rising civic entitlements, i.e. democratization, affect citizens’ value 
orientations. Broadly speaking, the support for one of the most important 
democracy-compatible values, i.e. autonomy, is influenced by the quality 
of the institutional guarantees of democracy. It has already been debated 
elsewhere that the communist regime, with its political oppression, 
surveillance, and indoctrination, undermined the value of autonomy 
among its citizens (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). The people, in a way, 
adapted to the communist regime by downgrading those values that 
stood in conflict with the environmental “reinforcements” (Schwartz & 
Bardi, 1997). By the same token, creating opportunities to exercise 
freedoms and rights with the introduction of the democratic institutions 
could have enabled the acceptance of and desire for autonomy. Making 
people more prone to cherish democratic norms and values is thus 
achievable through more positive outcomes of the democracy itself. It 
seems that the institutions may enhance or inhibit the perceived utility of 
the relevant values (Pavlović, 2016).  
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The rationale behind the culturalist model of political culture change 
is that socio-economic development makes people more intellectually, 
cognitively and socially independent (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 
2013). This is, additionally, rooted in the Maslowian conception of the 
hierarchy of needs; gaining more control over resources, broadly 
speaking, makes people more likely to satisfy and take for granted the 
lower order needs (such as economic security) and thereby able to pursue 
higher order ones (e.g. freedom of choice) (Inglehart, 1990).  
Still, quite contrary to the Maslowian reasoning in understanding 
human values, some other theories of human motivation have quite 
different, though equally applicable postulates. The self-determination 
theory (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2011) seems to be especially relevant since its 
main focus is on autonomy as a basic psychological need, and the social 
(familial, institutional, political etc.) context supportive of autonomous 
self-regulation. People are driven by the fundamental needs of autonomy 
(having volition and control over actions), competence and relatedness. 
The self-determination theory suggests that people are more active, 
thriving, and fully functioning in the contexts where they can experience 
competence, relatedness and autonomy; for example, in a democratic 
political system far more than in a non-democratic one (Downie, 
Koestner & Chua, 2007). In Maslow’s theory or the models derived from 
it, pursuing emancipative values is conditional and dependent on the 
satisfaction of some other more basic needs. Quite the contrary, the self-
determination theory states that the pursuit of autonomy is dependent on 
the promotion and support of nothing but autonomy, regardless of, for 
example, material well-being. In other words, in order to make people 
value intrinsic goals, we must satisfy their need for autonomy by creating 
an autonomy supportive context. Studies have shown that the benefits of 
self-determination are not limited to wealthier countries or individuals 
who are more likely to have the necessary financial resources (e.g. 
Downie et al., 2007). Having the means (resources) and the opportunity 
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(self-determination) to pursue one’s own goals is essential. Democracy 
might not immediately bring the former, but almost certainly brings the 
latter.  
In other words, instead of being a consequence of the lower order 
needs fulfilment, the preference for autonomy could be more an 
expression of the perceived utility of freedoms. These arguments gain a 
special relevance in the case of the ex-communist countries, where state 
oppression and subjection to an authoritarian and non-democratic rule 
could have made the incompatibility between individual self-
determination and prevailing institutional arrangements more 
prominent (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003). Growing opportunities could 
enable a growing satisfaction of the need for autonomy, which 
consequently can lead to higher valuing of emancipative goals. The self-
determination theory assumes that under typical, “good enough” 
conditions people actively attempt to internalize and integrate socially 
endorsed values, identities and regulations, which, for example, suddenly 
become democratic ones. These norms, rules, and values will be more 
fully integrated to the extent that they are transmitted in an autonomy 
supportive way and that they are not antithetical to basic need fulfilment. 
The introduction of democracy and making it more institutionally 
guaranteed provides just that.  
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Zoran PAVLOVIĆ 
Bojan TODOSIJEVIĆ 
PROMENE U VREDNOVANJU AUTONOMIJE U BIVŠIM KOMUNISTIČKIM 
DRUŠTVIMA: ULOGA SOCIO-EKONOMSKOG RAZVOJA I RAZVOJA 
GRAĐANSKIH PRAVA 
APSTRAKT 
 
Autonomija ima ključno mesto u većem broju modela vrednosti i smatra 
se veoma važnom karakteristikom demokratske političke kulture. Cilj 
ovog rada je analiza vrednovanja autonomije u većem broju bivših 
komunističkih i nekomunističkih evropskih društava, promene koje se u 
tom smislu registruju u periodu od 1999. do 2009. godine, kao i glavne 
determinante tih promena. Korišćeni su podaci koji su prikupljeni unutar 
Evropske studije vrednosti i Svetske studije vrednosti i analizirani na 
agregatnom nivou. U analizu je uključeno ukupno 38 evropskih država, 
što obuhvata 47.999 ispitanika u 1999. godini i 58.155 ispitanika u 2009. 
godini. Vrednovanje autonomije operacionalizovano je putem 
preferencije osobina koje bi deca trebalo da usvoje u porodici, 
suprotstavljajući podršku nezavisnosti/odlučnosti i religioznosti/ 
poslušnosti. Freedom House i Human Development Index mere korišćene 
su kao pokazatelji nivoa građanskih i političkih prava, odnosno, socio-
ekonomskog razvoja države. Rezultati ukazuju da u polovini bivših 
komunističkih i većini nekomunističkih evropskih društava postoji 
pomak ka izraženijoj preferenciji autonomije u desetogodišnjem periodu. 
U slučaju nekomunističkih društava, pomak ka većem vrednovanju 
autonomije podstaknut je socio-ekonomskim razvojem. S druge strane, 
jačanje garancija građanskih i političkih prava i sloboda glavni je faktor 
promocije autonomije u grupi bivših komunističkih društava. U 
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zaključnom delu, dobijeni rezultati diskutovani su u kontekstu 
institucionalnog modela političke kulture i glavnih pretpostavki teorije 
samodeterminacije.  
KLJUČNE REČI: autonomija, vrednosti, bivša komunistička društva, 
Evropska studija vrednosti 
